Delaware LLC Act Update: 2026 Key Amendments and Case Law Trends
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The Delaware limited liability company (LLC) remains one of the most widely used business entities globally, thanks to the flexibility and contractual freedom offered by the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act.
Join us for a complimentary CSC webinar exploring the 2026 amendments to the Act, along with recent key case law developments. This session will help you stay current and better advise clients leveraging Delaware’s LLC statute.
Webinar transcript
Annie: Hello, everyone, and welcome to today's webinar, "Delaware LLC Act Update 2026 Key Amendments and Case Law Trends." My name is Annie Triboletti. I will be your moderator kicking things off today.
So joining our session today are Mike Maxwell and Alyssa Frank from Potter Anderson and Helena Ledic f rom CSC. So with that, I would like to turn things over to our presenters.
Helena: Thank you so much, Annie. Hi, hello to everyone in the audience. Thank you so much for joining us. And I have to tell you, I think this is going to be a fantastic webinar. Mike, Alyssa, and I saw each other about a month ago at an LLC conference that was being held by the ABA. And so they are up on all the latest and the greatest to share with you about the Delaware LLC Act. So we'll be hearing from them.
So what we're going to do is we're going to get started off with our introduction, which we're doing now. Alyssa is going to walk us into some of the Chancery Court statistics, the updated statistics. Mike is going to take us into the case law developments for 2026. Alyssa is going to then cover the amendments to the Delaware LLC Act.
And with that, let's get started with the 10-year trends on the statistics. And Alyssa, why don't you take it away?
Alyssa: Will do. Thank you so much, Helena. And hello, everyone. Thank you for joining us today.
So we've just included here a chart that shows the last 10 years of the Delaware Court of Chancery's caseload trends for civil actions. I think the only thing really to note here is just that the Chancery Court civil docket has remained consistently robust over the past decade. It reflects Delaware's continued prominence as a leading forum for corporate governance, fiduciary duty, M&A, and other complex business disputes.
You'll see for Fiscal Year 2025 that civil filings increased about 6.1% from 2024 and dispositions increased 21.5%. So that's an indication both of just the demand but also of the Court's continued efforts to manage a growing caseload.
And I would say something that sort of follows in that vein. we have some developments here from Fiscal Year 2025. And one of those is the Court's expansion of its magistrate bench. And then, again, just its focus on it has increased civil filings, but it's also increasing its dispositions. So they're staying busy. They're working hard to just stay on track and get through all of their case activity. And yeah, I would say that the Chancery Court just shows its continued focus on maintaining the judicial infrastructure that's necessary to support Delaware's role as a preeminent forum for corporate law disputes.
We just included here on this slide a little bit more information about the expansion of the Magistrate in Chancery bench and then just some of the leadership changes as well.
And with that, unless, Mike, you have anything to add, I'll turn it over to you to get into the recent case law updates.
Mike: Great. Thanks, Alyssa. And hello, everyone. As Alyssa mentioned, it's interesting because the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Complex Commercial Litigation Division continue to be busy and in particular dealing with alternative entity cases. And what we're discussing today is, of course, the LLC case law developments.
But it's interesting when I first started practicing many, many years ago, there were not a whole lot of cases dealing with LLCs. Certainly it had some. There were some with limited partnerships, but the case law was not as robust. And I'd say over the past decade and a half the case law for LLCs has developed quite a bit, and we are consistently seeing cases dealing with interpretation of LLC provisions or LLC agreement provisions that are relatively common, interpretation of the LLC Act itself, and addressing these types of issues on a regular basis.
In fact, this year there was a number of LLC cases. it was hard to select the few that we're going to discuss today. But we picked a few. I think, hopefully, we've got five decisions we're going to discuss that cover several different topics in the LLC practice, including how far contractual limits on suing or antisuit or consent-to-sue provisions may reach, what it takes to dissolve, wind up, and cancel an LLC cleanly, and when a cancellation can be revoked or undone. We're going to discuss how private equity recapitalizations might collide with minority consent and governance rights. And then we're going to also discuss how the court polices fiduciary duties, the implied covenant inside heavily negotiated agreements. In particular, the last case we'll talk about, the Calumet case, about what's required to really clearly and unambiguously eliminate fiduciary duties in an LLC agreement.
So with that, well, I guess, the other thing I'll mention here too is there's a couple of themes that run through these cases. First, as you may know, the policy of the LLC Act is freedom of contract and giving maximum enforceability to the operating agreement. I think that policy or that concept is still the lodestar. The court is going to enforce a deal that the parties struck, whether that's good or bad.
Second, and maybe in tension with this first point, is that the courts will not let drafters escape fiduciary duties or the implied covenant through ambiguity. And it's increasingly holding members to their own conduct. And so we're going to walk through each of these cases over the next little bit and talk about some of the key takeaways from each of these that we can consider as you're practicing LLC law or dealing with these types of entities, things to consider if you're drafting or advising clients on these.
So we'll start with the first case, which is the Dynamk Funds case. So in this case, in 2015, there were siblings, Mario and Daniella Kranjac, that launched a venture capital firm focused really on early-stage life sciences companies. They operated through Dynamk Fund Advisors LLC. So this is the company that we're talking about.
Daniella was a biochemical engineer with 25 years of life science experience. And Mario was a corporate lawyer, who founded and ran a law firm, and he's the one that drafted the LLC agreement.
The company was manager-managed. And in Article Six of the LLC Agreement, the General Authority Provision named Daniella and Mario's affiliates as managers. And it divided day-to-day responsibilities between them, but required "Member consent" for certain "material or non-day-to-day decisions." So during the relevant period, the company had three members — Mario, Daniella, and Vogt – and each held only a minority interest. The LLC Agreement contained what I'll call an antisuit provision. It required majority member approval before commencing any litigation involving the company.
Over time, Daniella and Mario's relationship deteriorated, and eventually Daniella formed a separate venture capital platform after the siblings could not agree on how to structure a successor investment fund. So in November of 2023, Mario filed an arbitration action against Daniella and Vogt among others and asserted multiple direct and derivative claims, including breach of fiduciary duties and breach of contract. In response, Daniella and Vogt asserted multiple counterclaims against Mario, but unlike Mario, they only asserted direct claims in their own name and not on behalf of the company.
In 2025, the arbitrator issued a 99-page ruling in the form of an award, which rejected all of Mario's claims and concluded that the siblings never agreed to divide their managerial responsibilities equally, Mario never actually assumed any managerial authority, Mario was not entitled to equal management rights per the LLC Agreement, and Mario had no unilateral management authority on behalf of the company without majority approval. So in the Court's view, the arbitrator interpreted, again, this antisuit provision as requiring majority approval only when bringing a company claim, including a derivative claim, but not when asserting a direct claim.
So the arbitration award recognized that Mario could assert claims involving the company without first obtaining majority approval as long as the claim was direct. So, for example, the award concluded that Mario did not need majority approval for a books and records claim, which clearly involved the company as an example. So the New York Supreme Court subsequently confirmed the award, and this resulted in a final judgment.
So coming to the case at hand, in 2025, Mario filed this action asking the Court to judicially dissolve the company, under Section 18-802 of the Delaware LLC Act, on the grounds that it was not reasonably practicable to carry on its business. The company argued, in response, that Mario could not file any claim involving the company without first obtaining majority approval. Because Mario did not obtain majority approval, the company sought to dismiss the lawsuit.
So the issue here is whether the antisuit provision bars a member from petitioning for judicial dissolution without majority member approval, and whether the petition pleads deadlock, making it not reasonably practicable to carry on the business of the company. So the Motion to Dismiss was granted, and the Court found that the antisuit provision does not bar the dissolution petition, but that Mario failed to state a claim because no deadlock was reasonably conceivable.
So how did we get there? So the Court identified competing readings of the provision. So the manager-authority reading of the antisuit provision limited the antisuit provision to a manager's power to cause the company to sue, essentially leaving a member's direct and derivative claims untouched.
His sister's every-claim reading, what the court termed as the every-claim reading would bar any claim involving the company absent majority approval. Now the company interpreted the antisuit provision to bar anyone, including a member, from bringing any claim involving the company without majority approval. In other words, the every-claim reading. It further contended that the award adopted the every-claim reading, and the judgment implemented it, binding the Court of Chancery to this reading.
The Court of Chancery stated that if it were ruling on a clean slate, it would probably reject the every-claim reading and hold that the antisuit provision did not apply because Mario was bringing the suit as a member. However, the Court agreed with the company that issue preclusion applied and, therefore, required the Court to apply the antisuit provision as interpreted by the award, the arbitration award that is, and implemented by the judgment.
So in the Court's view, the judgment implemented the company-claim reading. So the court disagreed with the sister's interpretation. But the Court said that the judgment implemented this company-claim reading, not the every-claim reading. And so under the company-claim reading, the question before the Court became whether a claim for dissolution was a claim belonging to the company, such that a member must assert it derivatively, and if that was the case, then the antisuit provision or the consent requirement was applicable. If not, then Mario could bring the claim in his individual capacity.
So in determining whether Mario's claim was direct or derivative, the Court turned to Delaware Supreme Court precedent in the Tooley case. And the Tooley case clarified that stockholders of a corporation who suffer a direct injury can sue individually when they evoke their statutory or contractual rights, even if all the stockholders possess the same rights and suffer the same injuries. The Delaware Supreme Court's decision has confirmed that the direct nature of a stockholder's cause of action for injury to its contractual rights as a stockholder, even when asserting the same contractual rights in a representative capacity on behalf of all the stockholders.
So the Court then explained that a member in an LLC, and I think this is interesting, possesses analogous rights. It specified that as similar to stockholders, just as they can sue directly to enforce rights under a charter or bylaws or the provisions of the DGCL, members can sue directly to enforce contractual rights in an LLC under the LLC Act and under the LLC agreement. So although not all such claims are direct, the Court clarified that, under the LLC Act, the right to assert a claim for judicial dissolution is granted to any member and is direct. So the Court then determined that the antisuit provision did not apply and that Mario could bring the claim for judicial dissolution as a member without having to receive this majority approval consent.
But then the Court went on to consider whether Mario had stated a claim for which relief could be granted. In other words, was it no longer reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the LLC Agreement?
So one such scenario is where there's a deadlock at the governing body level and no means of breaking the deadlock. That's highlighted in case law regarding judicial dissolution fairly well. The Court, again, recognized that it's bound under this award and judgment, and the arbitration award has made clear that despite Mario being a nominal manager, he had no authority over day-to-day issues. So he had no unilateral authority to make any management decisions without majority approval. So that effectively gave Daniella, his sister, sole authority over day-to-day issues.
So the Court held that there could not be a manager-level deadlock, given that the award and the judgment's allocation of authority to Daniella and paring back Mario's lack of authority or highlighting his lack of authority provided that there just couldn't be a deadlock at the manager level. They also went on to state that there could not be a member-level deadlock because each of the three members held minority interest, and any two of them could have delivered majority approval. In other words, there's never really a situation where a deadlock was going to be reasonably conceivable. So the Court then held that Mario failed to state a claim for judicial dissolution, and the Court granted the company's Motion to Dismiss.
So what are some takeaways from this case? Well, first, I think these consent-to-sue provisions, antisuit provisions generally reach company and derivative claims, not necessarily a member's direct statutory rights, such as dissolution or books and records. But if the desire is to have those covered by an antisuit type provision, that needs to be drafted explicitly and into the contract or the LLC agreement. Also we should probably expect that Delaware courts are going to look with skepticism towards these types of covenants not to sue.
Another takeaway is a confirmed arbitration award can have an issue preclusive effect and fixed meanings of governance provisions in later litigation. So just be aware of the preclusive reach of any prior member disputes.
And finally, even a member-drafted LLC agreement can be construed against its drafters later in a litigating position. So precise allocation of managerial authority controls whether a deadlock can exist, so in other words, clear drafting on your management provisions, how you allocate management authority. And honestly, the other thing to deal with is who's determining that. Is it an arbitrator, or is it a court? And there are benefits to having both. But just be aware that if an arbitration award is handed down in the future on something that may provide any future litigation as binding and issue preclusive there. So clear drafting and controlling whether and how your management works. It's easy to Monday morning quarterback in these situations, but trying to anticipate these types of issues and be as clear as possible in the drafting.
All right. So our next case is Lafferty v. Corient Partners. So in this case, another one dealing with an arbitration twist, Plaintiff John Merrill Laferty was a wealth manager and investment advisor that became a member of Corient Partners. And in connection with becoming a member, he executed a joinder agreement to the Fourth Amended and Restated LLC Agreement of the LLC, and he agreed to be bound by the Fourth Amended and Restated LLC Agreement as the same may be amended from time to time.
Now the Fourth LLC Agreement contained a Delaware exclusive form clause. And then under Section 10.01, the Corient or the CI member had authority to unilaterally modify or amend the agreement, provided that it cannot be amended in any manner that will materially, adversely, and disproportionately affect any member or class of members without the consent of such member or a majority and interest of such class. So this is a pretty typical provision that we'll see in LLC agreements, providing a carveout to broad grants of authority to parties to amend an agreement and really designed to protect minority members or members that may not be able to effect an amendment unilaterally.
So through a series of corporate transactions in 2023, Corient Management became the majority member of Corient Partners or the LLC that we're talking about. On February 7th, 2024, Corient Management amended the Fourth Amended and Restated LLC Agreement and adopted a Fifth Amended and Restated LLC Agreement. And that Fifth Amended and Restated LLC Agreement changed the company's dispute resolution framework by eliminating the existing forum selection clause, so the Delaware exclusive forum selection clause, and then it replaced it with a mandatory arbitration provision in New York or Florida.
And then, in August of 2024, Corient issued a Notice of Conversion to all Class B unit holders, stating that the Class B units had been converted to Class A units. And the Notice of Conversion also explained that future distributions would be tied to the Fifth Amended and Restated LLC Agreement. In order to accept the Class A units, the holders had to sign an Equity Award Agreement. And the Equity Award Agreement stated that the acceptance of the Class A units was subject to the terms and conditions of several documents, which included the Notice of Conversion, which were incorporated in their entirety into the Equity Award Agreement. And recalled that the Notice of Conversion explained that the future distributions were tied to the Fifth Amended and Restated LLC Agreement.
So Lafferty, he accessed and signed the Equity Award Agreement early January or mid-January 2025. He also checked a box affirming that he had read and understood the Notice of Conversion, and upon the conversion, he accepted the units and distributions without objection.
In December 2025, Lafferty resigned from Corient and registered as an investment advisor with a competing investment management company. And at that time, Lafferty had accepted the benefits of the Fifth Amended and Restated Agreement for nearly a year, including conversion of the Class B profits units to Class A units that included downside protection. He had a grant of 238 new units and received quarterly distributions, all in all totaling around $7 million in value.
So Corient initiated an arbitration against Lafferty, in Miami, Florida, in connection with his resignation and starting work with a competitor. Lafferty's counsel sought an adjournment, arguing that Lafferty did not sign and was not aware of the Fifth Amended and Restated LLC Agreement. The arbitrator held that there was ample evidence that Lafferty had expressly adopted the Fifth Amended and Restated LLC Agreement and entered in a temporary restraining order against Lafferty.
So then Lafferty filed suit in Delaware, seeking to permanently enjoin the Miami arbitration, contending that the Fourth LLC Agreement, not the Fifth, governed. The Court granted a temporary restraining order and a motion to expedite, and the parties agreed to an expedited trial on a paper record.
So a couple of issues that come up in this case is whether the Court or the arbitrator decides which agreement was formed and governs, whether the unilateral amendment to essentially to the Fourth LLC Agreement, amending and restating into the Fifth Agreement was valid absent Lafferty's consent, and whether Lafferty had assented to the Fifth Amended and Restated LLC Agreement, including its arbitration clause.
So ultimately, the Court decided against and denied the injunction and gave judgment for the defendants. Lafferty was found to be bound by the Fifth Amended and Restated LLC Agreement, including its arbitration provision.
So how did how did they get there? Well, under Delaware law, the Court first analyzed and noted that questions of contract formation and existence are for the court and not the arbitrator, even where the agreement contains a broad delegation clause or arbitration clause. The court first must determine whether the contract containing the provision was validly formed. And so here, because the dispute hinged on whether Lafferty assented to the Fifth Amended and Restated LLC Agreement or whether the Fourth continued to remain the operative agreement, the Court retained subject matter jurisdiction to decide which contract governed.
Section 10.01 of the Fourth Amended and Restated LLC Agreement barred unilateral amendments that materially and adversely and disproportionately affected any member without consent. So here, interestingly enough, the Court assumed and did not get into this analysis directly. It just assumed, without deciding, that the consent was required because the record showed Lafferty gave it. So the Court kind of punted on this issue, finding that regardless of whether this had a material, adverse, and disproportionate effect on Lafferty, he consented to the agreement, and we'll get into that in a second. But presumably, by jumping to that conclusion or showing that he consented, there's some implication, I guess you would say, that the Court assumed that the consent was required. I think that's still an open issue, but it's something to keep in mind as it's just another touchpoint on when you're interpreting provisions of an LLC agreement dealing with material, adverse, and disproportionate effect on a member.
Here, though, Lafferty assented in writing by executing the Equity Award Agreement. So the Court recalled that the Notice of Conversion provided for the new units and the conversion of the units to be governed by the Fifth Amended and Restated LLC Agreement, and it incorporated that Notice of Conversion. So here, Lafferty assented in writing by executing the Equity Award Agreement that incorporated the Notice of Conversion. As a sophisticated party, he objectively manifested assent to the Fifth Amendment and Restated LLC Agreement. And a signature on an instrument that's incorporating a governing agreement binds the signatory to the whole agreement, not just the favorable parts.
The Court also found that Lafferty assented by conduct, so essentially stating that a party cannot stay silent or silently accept a contract's benefits and then object to its disadvantages. And again, recall that he accepted over $7 million in benefits for nearly a year, objectively manifesting assent, including to the arbitration provision.
And then, finally, there was an email from the CEO, at the time that the notice was sent out, stating that there were really no material changes. The Court rejected Lafferty's reliance on this email, stating that Lafferty had at least constructive notice of the amendment. He was given access to the Fifth Amended and Restated LLC Agreement a week later, and then he executed the Equity Award Agreement 11 months afterwards. So he could not invoke the email to excuse failing to read the contract.
So some of the key takeaways here to keep in mind as you're dealing with these types of entities. One is assent by conduct binds. So a member who's accepted economic benefits under a unilaterally amended agreement may be deemed to have adopted all its terms, which in this case included a new arbitration clause. So if you're wanting to contest an amendment or object to an amendment, that should be done promptly and consider whether accepting the benefits puts you in a position where you're, by your conduct, potentially assenting to the action.
Again, courts, not arbitrators, decide which agreement is formed before reaching arbitrage ability. So even where a delegation or arbitration clause exists, delegation to the arbitrator exists.
Another thing to keep in mind, the amended from time to time language combined with incorporation by reference can be a powerful tool. It can potentially bind a member to later amendments that the member never separately negotiated.
And then finally, as was indicated by the discussion on the reliance email, a summary email describing an amendment does not excuse a sophisticated party from reading the actual agreement. So before you sign anything or as counsel advising your clients, they need to understand what they're signing and make sure they're reading the actual agreement. So a couple of points there to keep in mind.
All right. Our next case is the Reinz Wisconsin Gasket. Now this has been an ongoing drama in the Chancery Court I think for two and a half, three years or so. So this is the latest iteration in a case that's produced a number of different decisions in connection with a dissolution and winding up of an LLC and really on the restoration or attempts to restore an LLC that's been terminated back to legal existence.
So keep in mind that, in the LLC context, dissolution is typically a moment in time, which kicks off a winding-up phase, where the LLC is required to satisfy creditors to the extent it has assets, and then to distribute any remaining assets after satisfaction of all its liabilities to the member. Only after all that is done is the LLC allowed to file what's called a certificate of cancellation that terminates, at that point, the legal existence of the LLC, which means it can no longer be represented by counsel, it can no longer take actions. It's its legal existence really is no longer. And that was the subject of a couple of the earlier cases in dealing with an appointment of a receiver and determining whether this LLC needs to be restored to legal existence.
So just by way of reminder and background here, so Reinz Wisconsin Gasket, LLC was a Delaware gasket manufacturer that dissolved and filed a Certificate of Cancellation in 2022. Nine months before it was dissolved, Linda Cook, the Plaintiff, sued the LLC for products liability in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Cook, the Plaintiff, had filed the Delaware action seeking nullification of the LLC Certificate of Cancellation and claimed that the dissolution and the winding up was not properly accomplished and violated Sections 18-203 and 18-804 of the Delaware LLC Act. Cook alleged that the LLC had assets, including insurance policies and certain litigation claims that it failed to set aside for claimants when it filed its dissolution and then cancelled.
So as I mentioned, the prior decisions by the Court led to the appointment of a receiver to investigate whether the LLC had any assets. And the receiver determined that there were three potential asset types when it dissolved. We'll get into those in a second. So the LLC, keep in mind, had been inoperative for over a decade when it dissolved. So it had been sitting there as a shell of a company, not really doing anything. The sole member had sole discretion over a dissolution decision.
So in order to determine what assets the LLC had when it was dissolved, the Court undertook an analysis of its corporate history, which included a number of purchases, sales, renaming. It was a complicated corporate history. But essentially, after evaluating all of these transactions, including a bankruptcy and reorganization and restructuring, at the end of the day, the Dana Corp, called DCo, Dana Company's LLC became the sole member. In October of 2020 or in January of 2021, as we mentioned, the LLC was named as a defendant in these asbestos lawsuits. And interestingly here, the Court recognized that the LLC began investigating its insurance coverage at that time. And the LLC's vice president acknowledged around that time that they should have access to historical insurance policies from predecessor entities, but no one at the LLC could find anything relating to such policies. Keep in mind that the complex corporate history, including lots of transactions, sales, and a bankruptcy and restructuring.
So the LLC hired an insurance archivist to assist it in finding anything relating to the policies, but the archivist could also not find any insurance policies. So having failed to locate the insurance policies, the sole member of the LLC decided to dissolve the LLC. And they underwent a due diligence period and determined that they did not have any assets or insurance available, and then they filed its Notice of Dissolution and Cancellation in 2022.
The LLC was named a defendant in the Massachusetts action the prior year, in 2021. And in September, so shortly after the filing of the Certificate of Cancellation, Cook, the Plaintiff here, filed a petition in the Court of Chancery, requesting the appointment of receiver to determine whether the LLC actually held any insurance policies or assets available to satisfy a damage award for the Massachusetts action. It also requested that they find the LLC's dissolution improper and then void the Certificate of Cancellation, essentially restoring it back to a legal existence.
As I mentioned in the prior actions, the Court found that Cook had demonstrated good cause, that's the standard under 18-805 of the LLC Act, to appoint a receiver, but deferred on ruling on whether the Certificate of Cancellation should be nullified until the receiver had made its findings as to whether the LLC held any assets, including these insurance policies. In March of 2025, the receiver submitted a final report, which identified 33 insurance policies purportedly affording coverage to the LLC at the time of dissolution and concluded that the LLC possessed assets in the form of litigable claims, and these claims included insurance coverage claims, breach of fiduciary duty claims against the LLC's officers or directors, and aiding and abetting claims.
So this opinion at the Chancery Court level resolved this nullification motion, or essentially whether the LLC should have its Certificate of Cancellation nullified and be restored to legal existence. The Court noted here that this required proof of a statutory violation by a preponderance of the evidence, which is a higher bar than the reasonably likely good cause standard.
So then the question here is whether the LLC held assets that it failed to set aside for the claimants, when it dissolved, warranting nullification of the Certificate Cancellation. Ultimately, the Court denied the motion, finding that the petitioner failed to prove by preponderance of the evidence that the LLC held qualifying assets.
So, again, how did we get there? So Section 18-804 requires that a dissolved LLC, as I had mentioned, make a provision that it will be reasonably likely sufficient to provide compensation for pending claims. It also requires that the LLC do the same for foreseeable future claims likely to arise or become known to the LLC within 10 years after the date of dissolution. That said, an LLC that has no assets can dissolve in compliance with the Act.
The Court relied on, in running through its analysis, a corporate case called In re Kraft-Murphy Co. And essentially, this is a case evaluating contingent rights, such as insurance policies and litigation claims, and when those become assets for purposes of winding up. Here, the Court said that those insurance policies and litigation or litigable claims are 18-804 assets only if they are, one, capable of vesting and, two, represent significant potential indemnification value. In other words, they're able to provide reasonable compensation for claims.
So working through the identified insurance policies that were provided by the receiver, the Court found that these insurance policies gave the LLC no coverage. The petitioner failed to prove two policies existed, and it failed to prove that the LLC acquired rights under a number of the others, again based on its complex corporate history. And then, also, the petitioner failed to prove that others could compensate pending or likely claims.
The Court as to there were pre-asset sale policies, so these are prior to some of those restructuring transactions, there's no transfer. Again, also the Court found that a couple of the policies, as I mentioned, did not cover these types of claims that we're dealing with in this situation, third-party asbestos claimants whose decedent in this case was never an employee, and so the umbrella policies did not apply.
So again, the Court worked through these 33 insurance policies and found that, for various reasons, they were not truly assets and not applicable to provide any relief to the LLC or to provide something that the LLC could use to fund assets.
So then the litigable claims, the Court found that those offered no value as well. It said a certificate is not going to be nullified over hypothetical claims. So the fiduciary duty theories that were brought by the receiver or advanced by the petitioner were largely exculpated by the LLC's operating agreement, so in other words, liability only for willful misconduct, knowing criminal violation, or knowingly exceeding authority. And there was no fiduciary duty owed to the claimants like the petitioner.
Then the Court also addressed an implied covenant theory that they said also failed, noting that the claimants were not parties to the LLC's operating agreement, that the LLC was a decade dormant, assetless, and the LLC suffered no injury from the discretionary decision of its member to dissolve.
So at the end of the day, again, three-year drama, including appointment of a receiver to investigate whether there are actually assets held at this LLC. And at the end of the day, the Court found that there was nothing there and denied to nullify the Certificate of Cancellation and revive the dissolved LLC.
So again key takeaways here. A claimant has to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the LLC holds assets, and that contingent rights relying on corporate precedent, like Kraft-Murphy, are only capable of vesting and carrying significant indemnification value qualify only if they're capable of vesting and carry significant indemnification value. An LLC with no assets can dissolve and cancel in compliance with the Act. So speculative insurance coverage and hypothetical litigable claims are not going to be enough to revive it. And a broad operating agreement exculpation clause can defeat the value of fiduciary claims a receiver might otherwise pursue against the dissolved entity.
All of these things are things to keep in mind as you're drafting your LLC agreements dealing with these types of issues. In part, because keeping in mind that in particular in this case when you're dealing with speculative insurance, and this is a case, I guess, with a lot of LLCs and companies when you have a complex corporate history, it's hard to keep track of all those, but a best practice would be to understand what assets are there, remember to account for those types of things when you're dealing with a winding up, especially if you can on the front end of the dissolution winding up process address those types of issues so that they don't provide fodder for a petitioner to try and revive the entity to research into that.
All right. So we'll move to the next case here quickly. So this is the Lehr v. Aspen Power Partners case. And this is a dispute concerning governance and economic restructuring of Aspen Power Partners LLC, that came after a $200 million capital infusion by a private equity sponsor, Carlyle, shifted board control. So the challengers here are early investors, Class B unit holders of Aspen Power and Class A members of a holding vehicle APP management, which itself held Class A units of Aspen Power.
The Class A units held by APP Management, that was an entity that was designed to pass through rights as if the member had held the Class A units directly. So the APP Management entity, the Class A unit entity had five members, including a number of the family or the B holders as well. So there are Class A plaintiffs and Class B plaintiffs here.
So the APP Management Management Agreement was governed by an LLC agreement, pursuant to which majority member approval was required to effectuate ordinary decisions, but unanimous approval was required to grant, consent, or waving or exercising of any rights under this Aspen Power operating agreement, so the underlying agreement. In September of 2022, the Fourth Amended and Restated LLC Agreement took effect, and the amendments were designed in part to admit Carlyle as a member of Aspen Power. And Carlyle, in connection with that, contributed $200 million in exchange for preferred units.
The LLC agreement also vested management in a seven-member board, with APP Management having the right to designate four managers, and Carlyle having the right to designate one manager, and then, Ultra Capital, another Class B member, having the right to designate a manager. The seventh manager was designated by the mutual agreement of Carlyle and APP Management. Amendments under the Fourth LLC Agreement required Carlyle's consent and unanimous board approval, in addition to the prior written consent of affected members for specified adverse changes, so certain adverse changes.
December of 2024, Aspen Power took steps to amend the Fourth LLC Agreement. Drafts were circulated, targeting finalization before the end of the year. And then a number of the Class A and Class B members objected that they did not approve the amendment and expressed concern. Despite their objections, the Board of Aspen Power unanimously executed the Fifth Amended and Restated LLC Agreement, and APP Management did not consent to the amendments.
So the Fifth LLC Agreement added three board seats. It gave Carlyle's designees four times the voting power, and it also eliminated APP Management's consulting rights, and certain drag-along rights were transferred to Carlyle as a majority member.
Third, certain phantom units were created as non-equity management incentive cash rights. And then there was what they call an MOIC uplift multiplier schedule for distributions, and it changed from annual to quarterly increases. And then, finally, preemptive rights were altered by expanding the definition of excluded securities and waiving rights for certain effective date-related issuances.
So here, the plaintiffs, some of these Class A and Class B members filed a complaint advancing declaratory judgment, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and implied covenant counts. Carlyle intervened, seeking declaration that the Fifth LLC Agreement governed. And the defendants moved to dismiss, under 12(b)(6). And the question is whether plaintiffs could recover under any reasonable conceivable circumstances.
So I think, for our purposes here, the focus is, and the Court went through a number of steps here, whether the Class A and Class B plaintiffs have standing, whether the amendment breached the plaintiffs' consent and governance and economic rights under the predecessor agreement, and whether the managers breached any of their fiduciary duties or implied covenant.
So the Motion to Dismiss was largely granted. Only a few narrow Class B breach of contract theory survived. And in coming to that decision, the Class A plaintiffs were found to lack standing because they're members of the APP Management, not members or managers of Aspen Power. And furthermore, because the APP Management's LLC agreement required the unanimous consent for any action in connection with Aspen Power, it contracted away derivative rights via this unanimous consent provision that was not satisfied here.
Class A plaintiffs, also the Court found that they lacked derivative standing because, again, the agreement required unanimous consent of all the members. Class A plaintiffs asserted certain direct breach of contract claims against Aspen Power, but the Court held that those were dismissed because the Class A plaintiffs were neither parties nor intended third-party beneficiaries of the Aspen LLC agreement.
The Court also had an interesting discussion on 18-110(a) and (b) and finding that, again, 18-110 empowers a court to hear and determine validity of an admission, election, appointment, removal, or resignation of managers. They said the 18-110(a) standing is limited to members or managers. So the C lass B unit holders qualified, but the Class A plaintiffs did not.
Anyways, there was a number of discussions, about standing, where the court was able to kick out a number of these claims. I think for our purposes, just in the interest of time, just to get through this a little bit more quickly is one of the claims, for example, was that the board composition had changed by adding three and that that triggered the consent right. But because those unfilled seats had not been filled at the time of the amendment, that they provided for, but they had not been filled, the Court found that the 18-110(a) claim was dismissed with respect to those Class B unit holders that did have that right to continue or that did have standing.
Then we come to fiduciary duty claims. There's a number of fiduciary duty claims, that the managers acted in their distinct capacity as Aspen Power managers, not as officers of APP Management. So here, the actions taken by . . . So a couple of the defendants were officers of APP Management as well as managers of Aspen Power. The Court noted that there's distinct survival, or the Court noted that you respect the separate corporate identity and so acting in a corporate capacity. So they found that these two defendants did not act in the capacity as an officer of APP Management, were acting in their capacity as managers of Aspen Power.
Then the Court held that, and here is where I think some of the discussions, some of the most interesting is that there was a number of changes, that they said that their consent was required in connection with the amendment, including changes to, just make sure I'm reading this correctly. So the Class B plaintiffs had argued that there were six amendments that require their prior written consent under the specified provisions for adverse effect, so giving the three additional board members or seats with four times the voting power, creating this preferred equity units, modifying the MOIC uplift multiplier schedule, removing the APP Management consulting rights, and transferring certain drag-along rights to Carlyle, and modifying the plaintiff's preemptive rights.
So the Court, again, found that the board composition and voting power changes did not trigger this consent because the LLC agreement specifically authorized the board, by unanimous approval, to change the board-side composition of voting power. Because another section, not the amendment section, but Section 5.8 was the more specific clause regarding amendments affecting board composition, it controlled over the more general provision. So a contract interpretation exercise.
The board unanimously voted to approve the changes. Second, the PPUs did not create an interest in Aspen Power or a right to distributions. As they were non-equity deferred cash compensation, they were excluded from distributions. Since they were not distributions, the 14.2 or this consent right in in the amendment section was not triggered.
The Court also held that, now here's where they did find that changing the MOIC uplift schedule from annual to quarterly increases could accelerate Carlyle's entitlement under the distribution waterfall, and that this was a factual dispute that needed to be resolved at a trial, not on a motion to dismiss.
Also, the Class B plaintiffs contended that transferring . . . yeah, so transferring the drag-along rights from APP Management to Carlyle, the Court interpreted the contract as to reflect that the controlling member, that the drag-along right really went with the controlling member, not a particular member. So it belonged to the control member, and the consulting right had expired before its removal.
Then finally, the plaintiffs contested changes to the expansion of excluded securities definition inclusion of preemptive rights waiver. The Court did find that by expanding the definition and imposing a waiver for certain issuances, that could adversely affect the Class B plaintiffs' rights.
I know we're running short on time. So, in short, I think there are a couple of takeaways here, and where this case could be helpful is when you're dealing with material adverse changes, dealing with private equity, and changes and amendments to an LLC agreement. You really want to reflect on what the changes are, how they're affected. And I think this case runs through a number of things that are helpful for understanding how the court interprets these types of provisions. And when a sponsor, for example, recapitalizes, nailing down the minority economic protections in advance and being the way there.
On this last case, we'll just briefly skim over this. I would recommend parties, especially if you're dealing with elimination of fiduciary duties, to review this. Really what this is addressing was there was a dispute that arose between an investor giving preferential access to loan deals. There was a lowball buyout offer, and claims were brought for breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and betting, breach of a service agreement, and breach of the implied covenant. The motion was denied on all four counts. The case proceeded.
And part of the issue here that was addressed at the outset and I think why this case is, in particular interesting is because it dealt with whether the LLC agreement properly waived fiduciary duties. And here, there was a provision that the Court noted was a long, run-on sentence, that had the elimination of fiduciary duties also combined with an exculpation provision. At the end of the day, there were a couple of different views of whether it was an exception to fiduciary duty view or the contract only view.
But ultimately, the Court found that if there was fraud or these standards of the willful misconduct or fraud, when that conduct was involved, regardless of whether it's the contract only view or the fiduciary exception view, that would have sustained the claims. But the Court went on to discuss and claim that this was the fiduciary exception view.
But I think the lesson here for drafters is when you're dealing with an elimination of fiduciary duties. when you have provisions that seem to read back in fiduciary duties because they're inconsistent, or there's a full elimination, but then you've got some exceptions or things that seem to implicate in the agreement elsewhere that fiduciary duties or certain fiduciary duties have survived, the court is going to use that to bring back in those fiduciary duties, or to bring in some type of fiduciary duties. So it's really important here to be clear on your drafting and how you're dealing with those with.
So I recommend that case. And again, these cases, as I mentioned, there's a number of takeaways, but it comes back to clear drafting and giving maximum effect to the LLC agreements and understanding what your rights are and obligations are under these agreements and how to best address those. But I found a lot of these cases dealing with the amendments to be helpful in analyzing those types of provisions as well.
With that, I will turn it over to Alyssa to briefly talk about our amendments.
Alyssa: Thank you, Mike. Yeah, so this is only going to take a few minutes because the 2026 legislative amendments to the Delaware LLC Act were pretty light. I would say they're just kind of housekeeping measures. Nothing too major, just some amendments that reinforce the Delaware LLC Act's emphasis on clarity and contractual freedom and operational flexibility. So really the headline here is just that with the adoption of these amendments, Delaware is continuing to affirm the freedom of contract principles of the Delaware LLC Act.
And you'll see here this overview is just very brief. Basically, the legislature added a definition of "certificate of registered series." And there were some changes made to sort of reinforce the contractual and transactional flexibility that's available under the LLC Act, particularly with respect to series LLCs.
So for the new definition, it's interesting because this phrase "certificate of registered series" has actually been in use throughout the Delaware LLC Act really since the concept of registered series was added, I think, back in 2018. And I've just listed here a few places where this phrase is already in use in the Delaware LLC Act. And the definition was added sort of just as a technicality so the practitioners and the courts can rely on consistent terminology when dealing with registered series of a Delaware LLC. It's a pretty simple definition.
And then the next couple of slides are just going through the amendments to Section 18-215(a). The Delaware LLC Act, they just underwent a few different revisions, which we'll actually show on the next slide, I think, to confirm, among other things, that an LLC agreement can create any of the following: a protected series, a registered series, or any other type of series that's neither a protected nor a registered series. And again, the takeaway here is just a reminder that the series of or the concept series in Delaware is fundamentally contractual in nature. And so while the statute expressly provides for protected and registered series, they're not the exclusive forms of series arrangements.
So what I mentioned earlier, we just included a screenshot here basically of the markup to 18-215(a) of the LLC Act, showing the various changes to this section from the 2026 updates. And I would say just the takeaway here is that these changes are intended to remove any inference that Section 18-215(a) has the effect of narrowing transactional flexibility. The changes are supposed to reinforce the availability of other statutory transactional provisions. And again, these amendments are intended to reduce uncertainty regarding entity-level transactions involving LLCs that have series.
The synopsis that was drafted to sort of summarize these legislative amendments expressly states that these 2026 amendments are not intended to limit the application of the principle of freedom of contract to any series. And I think it's one of those things where I feel like, Mike, you probably have encountered this too. I sort of field queries all the time about using series, using a series structure for a new transaction, and then because there just isn't that much case law around it, then people sort of get a little bit scared of actually trying it out. So I think that the different legislative committees in Delaware are just trying to, again, reinforce the notion that you have to draft for it. Like you have these sort of road maps in the Delaware LLC Act for protected and registered series, but a lot of it really just comes down to what you're putting into the LLC agreement and how you provide for the series.
These amendments became effective on August 1st, 2026. They've been signed by the governor. So they are they are in force. And I would say, again, just that these amendments are best understood as another example of Delaware taking an incremental approach to alternative entity law, which is to clarify and refine and preserve flexibility without disturbing any settled expectations.